Why did (not) the East Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Intra-Elite Conflict and Risk Sharing by Sayantan Ghosal & Eugenio Proto
Why did (not) the East Extend the Franchise?
Democracy, Intra-Elite Con￿ ict and Risk Sharing




The process of enfranchisement is studied in a model of intra-elite con￿ ict over the sharing
of social surplus. The relative bargaining power of each elite, function of the surplus each elite
is able to appropriate if the bargaining breaks down, is uncertain ex-ante. Accordingly, two
competing elites can decide to enfranchise a weak but numerically large non-elite group in order
to insure against future imbalances in relative bargaining power. The enfranchisement decision
requires the non-elite group to be relatively weak and imperfectly informed about intra-elite
bargaining power. Our results are robust to public good provision following enfranchisement
when there is preference heterogeneity over the location of the public good across the di⁄erent
elites. A comparative analysis of the Indian Democracy is provided.
1 Introduction
The idea that maintaining balance of power between competing elites is at the origin of the
process of the democratization is common among political scientists. For example Moore (1964,
pp. 435-437) notes that a fundamental precondition for a process of democratization in England
or in India was ￿...the weakening of the landed aristocracy [...by contrast...] a commercial and
industrial class which is too weak and dependent to take the power and rule in its own right and
which therefore throws itself into the arms of the landed aristocracy and the royal bureaucracy..."
led to the fascism in some countries like Germany or Japan.
￿University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK. Corresponding author email:
e.proto@warwick.ac.uk.
1More recently, Bardhan (1984, p.77) along similar lines emphasizes the capacity of the democ-
racy to manage the con￿ ict among equally powerful elites in the decision of sharing the social
surplus: ￿In a country where the elements in the dominant coalition are diverse, and each suf-
￿ciently strong to exert pressures and pulls in di⁄erent directions, political democracy may have
slightly better chance, than in other developing countries,(...). This is based not so much on
the strength of the liberal value system in its political culture as on the procedural usefulness of
democracy as an impersonal (at least arbitrary) rule of negotiation, demand articulation and bar-
gaining within coalition, and as a device by which one partner may keep the other partners at the
bargaining table within some moderate bounds￿ .1
Enfranchising the non-elites and involving them in the decision mechanism is a natural way to
give part of the elite the possibility of ￿nding partners for a coalition and, thus, of increasing their
relative bargaining power vis a vis other part of the elite. In France for example, Luis Napoleon
restored the male universal su⁄rage to balance the power between landed and urban elites.2
However, some questions naturally arise, it is not clear why the non-elite needs to be enfran-
chised for this purpose, i.e. why aren￿ t they limited to providing external support? and, perhaps
more importatly, why does the alliance with the non-elite not lead to an hegemony of one elite,
threatening rather than stabilizing the democratic institutions?
In this paper we will give a possible answer to these questions using a model of between classes
bargaining over a social surplus. The realative bargaining power of each elite is endogenously
determined as a function of the surplus each elite is able to appropriate if the bargaining breaks
down. We assume that the relative bargainig power is uncertain ex-ante, when the two elites
decide whether or not to extend franchise to weak but numerically large non-elite. Once the
enfranchisement decision has been made, nature then determines the relative bargaining power
of two elites. We assume that either of the two elites are ex-post informed about each others￿
bargaining power while the non-elite observe imperfect signal. All enfranchised agents vote over
surplus sharing proposals, but the outcome of the vote is not necessarily implemented since we
allow for ex-post renegotiation and bargaining.
We show that the franchise extension is an e⁄ective device for the two elites to insure against
relative shifts in bargaining power. In particular it ensures that, at the ex-post renegotiation
stage, the enfranchised non-elite ally with the weaker of the two elites in order to counterbalance
the power of the stronger of the two elites. A critical assumption for this to work is that enfran-
chisement gives to the non-elite an even negligibly small amount of bargaining power, which is
1See also Anderson (1972).
2Luis Napoleon also suggested the Prussian Governament to implement the same strategy, (Bardhan 1984).
2higher relative to the weaker of the two elites, and therefore enfranchisement gives an incentives
to collude with the weaker elite in any bargaining game with the stronger elite. Moreover, at the
voting stage of the game, the non-elite must be imperfectly informed about intra-elite bargaining
power. Otherwise, the non-elite would use their voting power to extract too much surplus and,
therefore, ex-ante they will not be enfranchised.
Furthermore, our results are robust to the introduction of public good provision conditional
on enfranchisement. Speci￿cally, we show that enfranchisement will lead to surplus sharing rather
than public good provision when the degree of preference heterogeneity across the two elites over
the location of the public good is high and therefore, surplus appropriation by the elites- allowed,
even with full enfranchisement, by the possibility of renegotiation- can crowd-out the more e¢ cient
public good provision.
Our results on enfranchisement are linked only to the con￿ ict resolution and surplus shar-
ing among the elites. Unlike existing literature (discussed below), we abstract from any issue
related to class complemetarity between sections of the elites and non elites in the production
process, and we allow for free renegotiation after the enfranchisement decision is taken. In this
respect, we demonstrate how ex-post renegotiation limits the level of redistribution or public good
provision demanded by the median voter under full enfranchisement. Therefore, we emphasize
that the improvement of the conditions of the lower classes do not necessarily follow the process
of democratization and, in the last section, we present the Indian democracy as an example of
democratization with little redistribution and little supply of public goods.
We argue that our model can explain many features of the Indian democracy in a comparative
analysis with other countries, where the dismissal of the English colonial rule was followed by a
not-so-successful attempt of instituting democratic institutions. Unlike Pakistan, the Indian elites
are particularly fragmented and often con￿ icting; and unlike Nigeria, the ethnic divisions are not
so strong to prevent the non elites from acting together. Therefore, our model suggests that at
the core of Indian democracy there is a delicate equilibrium between elites fragmentation, which
prevents the hegemony of one elite over the other, and the lack, to some extent, of geographically-
based ethnic con￿ icts, which in African regions prevented the formation of a uni￿ed working
class.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the relate literature. The main
model and its equilibria are analyzed in section 3. In section 4 we extend the model to consider
the possibility of supplying public goods. Finally section 5 is devoted to a comparative analysis
of the Indian democracy.
32 Related literature
While to the best of our knowledge, both the model and the results we obtain in this paper are
new, in what follows we relate what we do to the existing literature.
In Acemoglu and Robinson (1998), the decision of extending the franchise abstracts away from
intra-elite con￿ ict. Enfranchisement is an irreversible commitment to redistribute from the elites
to the non elites, under threat of revolution. Moreover, the nature of enfranchisement as commit-
ment rules naturally out the possibility of renegotiation.3 In our paper, the enfranchisement does
not imply long term commitment to redistribute to the non-elite, but only a negligibly small shift
in bargaining power to the non-elites. This opens the door to the possibility of renegotiating the
voting outcome with full enfranchisement and therefore, lowers the capacity of the enfranchised
class of appropriating surplus. Our outcomes seem more in line with the observation that in the
years following franchise extension in England in the nineteenth century there is no sign of an
increase in the transfers to lower classes (see Lizzeri and Persico (2004) for this evidence), and
with the evidence, presented in the last section, that in India there is no sign of reduction in the
index of wealth concentration after the full franchise extension in 1949.
Lizzeri and Persico (LP henceforth) study the decision of enfranchising the non elites in a
framework of internal con￿ ict within elite. They show that it is necessary to enlarge the number
of enfranchised individuals in order to discourage politicians from supplying transfer to buy voters
(the pork-barrel politcs) and to induce them instead to provide public goods. However, LP do not
consider the possibility of renegotiating the voting outcome in the regime of restricted franchise
and this assumption impacts on the incentives to enfranchise.4 In our paper, bargaining power
between classes is independent of the voting outcome. Therefore a section of the elite can always
renegotiate the electoral results if it happens to have the power to appropriate a large share of
the surplus, whether or nor the franchise is extended. LP model focuses on an environment where
3Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) partially relax this assumption, making that the decision of enfrachisment
reversible but costly.
4In order to illustrate this point we can use the initial example in LP. Let 1 be the social surplus to be allocated
to a one-unit population and G > 4 the value of a public good that can be produced with the social surplus. A
political party can win the election by redistributing when it needs to acquire only x ￿ 0:25 votes. This implies that
the enfranchised, say e; are less than 0:5: On the other hand a party can win by supplying the public good when
e > 0:5. This result, however, relies on the assumption that the part of the elite who do not receive any transfer,
e￿x; will accept this outcome, without being able to renegotiate. If a form of renegotiation is allowed, the promise
of the winning party to redistribute the entire surplus to its voters is not credible. Therefore, the provision of the
public good can be a winning strategy even without the franchise extension.
4some degree of democracy is already accepted, and the elites are already committed to accept the
electoral verdict, like the Britain "Age of Reform". Our aim is to provide an explanation where
the creation of democratic institutions starts from an initially non institutionalized environment.5
An important element common in the existing literature: in the above mentioned LP model,
in Llavador and Oxoby (2004) and Galor and Moav (2003) is the increasing complementarity
between working class and capital owners in a process of economic development, where the com-
plementarity between human capital and physical capital increases with the accumulation of the
latter. Therefore in a process of industrialization, the increasing interest of capital owners for
the human capital generated an incentive for the rich capitalistic elites to enfranchise the poor
non elite in order to support the same policies or to prefer the Pareto-improving supply of public
good to pork barrel politics. The obvious (and explicit) conclusion of these papers is that en-
franchisement is inherently linked to western capitalistic development.6 In or paper, we do not
need any technological complementarity among classes to achieve the full enfranchisement, which
allows us to consider the democratization process as independent from the modern capitalistic
development. This is important if we consider that India in 1946 was largely a pre-capitalistic
and rural society7.
3 Transfers and enfranchisement
3.1 A model
Our model has three time periods, t = 0;1;2. There are three classes of homogeneous agents:
W;K;L. There is a surplus of Y which has to be shared between the three classes. Individuals
in each class consume the surplus at t = 2. Preferences over consumption are represented by the
utility function u : <+ ! < where u0(:) > 0 > u00(:) which implies that individuals are strictly
risk averse. The total number of individuals has a mass of 1; with the mass of W larger than 1
2.
For simplicity we assume that the size of K and L are equal.
5In the last section, we will see that the Indian extension of franchise, decided just after its Indepency in 1946,
can be considered more a one-shot decision rather than a gradual process.
6Among traditional political scientists there has been a long debate on this issue: the moderniaztion theory of
Lipset (1959) claims the presence of a causality realationship from industrial develoment to democracy, and have
been widely criticised by other important following contributions like Diamond (1992) among others.
7Other models of franchise extension emphasize the idea of enfranchisement as a commitment device and include
Conley and Temini (2001), Bertocchi (2003), Fleck and Hanssen (2002).
From a di⁄erent perspective Ticchi and Vidigni (2003) show how elites enfranchise citizen in case of war to
increase their incentives to ￿ght.
5Each class (or coalition of classes) bargain over how to share the surplus Y , the bargaining
power of a class (or coalition of classes) is determined by the utility each class (or coalition of
classes) obtains if bargaining breaks down; we can imagine that in this case the class (or coalition
of classes) appropriate part of the surplus using the force, while some surplus gets destroyed.
Following the literature we call this utility the disagreement payo⁄s.
Let ￿ be a random variable generating the relative strength of the classes K and L, determined










Let i 6= j 6= k the indexes for di⁄erent classes and ￿ = ffig;fjg;fkg;fi;jg;fi;kg;fj;kgg the
set of all possible coalitions (except the grand coalition). We measure strength of a group ￿ 2 ￿
by the disagreement function d￿;￿0(￿), for each ￿0 2 ￿n￿. We make the following assumptions on
the disagreement function d￿;￿0(￿), ￿0 2 ￿n￿: Let i and j represent the two elites and ￿ = i 6= j,
we assume:
1. di;j (i) > dj;i (i) and di;j (i) + dj;i (i) < Y ;
2. dfj;Wg;i (i) > di;fj;Wg (i) and dfj;Wg;i (i) + di;fj;Wg (i) < Y
3. Without enfranchisement, for all ￿, dW;￿0 (￿) = 0 , with ￿0 2 ￿nfWg; while with enfranchise-
ment, dW;i (i) = dW;fi;jg (i) = 0, dW;j (i) = dW, dW positive but close to 0;
Assumption 1 formalizes the idea that either K or L is always the dominant class, are ex-ante
symmetric and their (relative) strength is determined by the state of nature ￿. In this sense, K;L
are sections of the elite. For Assumption 2 the coalition of the weakest elite with W has always has
greater strength than the prevailing elite on its own. Finally Assumption 3 states that irrespective
of the state of nature, W has the weakest bargaining power. Nevertheless, once enfranchised, W0s
bargaining power increases marginally and it is larger relative to the weakest class belonging to
the elite.8 We can justify this assumption in at least two ways: ￿rst, after enfranchisement, W0s
willingness to ￿ght increases as members of W obtain a psychological payo⁄from their identity as
voters; second, after enfranchisement, W0s ability to ￿ght increases as members of W organizes a
party for the election. This assumption is crucial since W can now accept to form a coalition with
one of the two elites and prefer a coalition with the weakest elites rather than with the stronger.
The sequence of events is as follows:
8For simplicity purposes we kept unchanged the bargaining power of W with the strongest elites, therefore the
bargaining power of W increase only with respect to the weakest elite.
6￿ Ex-ante enfranchisement: At t = 0, the set of voters is determined. We assume that only
the classes K;L are enfranchised as voters and are represented by their respective political
parties. However, by unanimous consent, both classes K;L can also decide whether or not
to enfranchise W.
￿ Interim majority voting: At the beginning of t = 1, nature chooses ￿. Both K and L observe
￿ but W receives a noisy signal s about ￿ so that conditional on ￿ = i;
s =
i with prob. q
j;j 6= i with prob. 1 ￿ q
(1)
such that 1
2 ￿ q < 1: Conditional on nature￿ s choice and signal sk, each enfranchised class
proposes a sharing rule ￿ = (￿K;￿L;￿W) of the surplus Y: The set of voters then vote
between sharing rules and the sharing rule with highest number of votes wins9.
￿ Ex-post renegotiation:
￿Step1 coup: At t = 2; ￿ is fully revealed to all classes. If the winning proposal from
the voting stage is accepted, the game ends and all classes consume their share of
the surplus Y according to victorious sharing rule. If after observing the sharing rule
chosen in the preceding period, class i = ￿ objects, the winning proposal from the
voting stage is rejected and the bargaining subgame begins.
￿Step 2 bargaining sub game:. If the deviating coalition consists of a single class i,
bargaining proceeds as follows. First, the two other classes j;k decide whether or not
to form a coalition. If no coalition is formed i bargains with the two classes separately
where each sequence of pairwise bargains has equal probability. If j;k decide to form a
coalition, then i bargains ￿rst with the coalition fj;kg and then, j and k bargain over
the share of the surplus appropriated in the preceding round of bargaining. At this
stage, the game ends and each class consumes its share of the surplus Y .
This completes the speci￿cation of the rules of the game. At the ex-post renegotiation stage,
at each step, bargaining outcomes are determined, sequentially, by Nash bargaining. Further,
we also require that at the ex-post renegotiation stage, for a deviating coalition to form, all its
members must strictly gain by deviating from the status quo10. Given the bargaining outcomes
9If there is more than one sharing rule with the highest number of votes, then each sharing rule in set of sharing
rules with the highest number of votes is selected with equal probability.
10One way to justify this requirement would be to assume that each class in a deviating coalition must bear a
negligibly small cost.
7at the ex-post renegotiation stage, we solve for the extensive-form game of enfranchisement and
voting by backward induction.
Bargaining sub game
We begin our formal analysis by deriving the bargaining outcomes of ex-post renegotiation.
In what follows, we summarize the bargaining outcomes of ex-post renegotiation by a "grabbing
function" c(￿;￿) that takes into account any coalition formation at the ex-post renegotiation
stage. that summarize the bargaining outcomes of ex-post renegotiation. Let c(fWg;￿) denote
the grab function for W without enfranchisement and c0(fWg;￿) denote the grab function for W
with enfranchisement.11
Lemma 1 Under assumptions (1)-(3), the grab function c(￿;￿) has the following properties:
1. The grab function is symmetric in K and L i.e. c(fKg;L) = c(fLg;K) = c1, (or equiva-
lently, c(fKg;K) = c(fLg;L) = Y ￿ c1) where Y ￿ c1 > c1;
2. A coalition of classes has always greater bargaining power than any one class on its own
c(fj;Wg;i) = c2 > Y
2 ;
3. For ￿ = i and i 6= j, c(fWg;￿) < c0 = c0(fWg;￿)g where c0 is small positive number
arbitrarily close to zero and c0 < c1.
Proof. See the appendix.
Given Assumptions 1-3, in the equilibrium path of the bargaining subgame the rejection of
the sharing rule will be followed by the formation of the coalition fj;Wg (when ￿ = i 6= j) that
will be able to grab some surplus, say c2;to i, then W will grab part of it , say c0; and the lasting
c2 ￿ c0 will be appropriated by the weakest elite j:
Using the grabbing function c(￿;￿) we will next determine the possible equilibria of the game
and, given assumptions 1-3, we will show that if individuals are enough risk averse the enfran-
chisement is the only possible subgame perfect equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibria
The subgame at t = 1 without enfranchisement
11It is useful to note the index j of function di;j (i), indicating the opposing coalition or groups, is redundant
(then it has been dropped ) in the grabbing function c(￿;￿) since this function measure the bargaining power on
the equilibrium path of play.
8Let us consider the case when ￿ = K: We demonstrate that along any equilibrium path of
play, the winning proposal is ￿K = Y ￿c1, ￿L = c1, ￿W = 0 and no coalition of classes will reject
the proposal. Under our assumptions, it is evident that on their own, neither K nor L can do
better by rejecting the winning proposal. Can L do better by building a coalition with W? Note
that coalition fL;Wg can grab c2 and therefore, on the face of it, L has an incentive to build a
coalition with W and reject the winning proposal. What about W￿ s incentive to join a deviating
coalition with L? Whatever be W￿ s signal, as c(W;￿) = 0, for ￿ = K;L, note that following any
deviation, L will appropriate c2 and leave nothing for W. But, then, W will have no incentive to
deviate with L. Finally, note that any proposal with ￿L > c1 will be rejected by K as K can grab
Y ￿ c1 on her own and further, any proposal with ￿L < c1 will be rejected by L as L can grab
Y ￿ c1 on her own. A symmetric argument establishes that when ￿ = L, along any equilibrium
path of play, the winning proposal is ￿K = c1, ￿L = Y ￿ c1, ￿W = 0 and moreover, no coalition
of classes will reject the proposal. Therefore we have the following result:
Lemma 2 Without enfranchisement, if ￿ = K, the sharing rule ￿K = Y ￿ c1, ￿L = c1, ￿W = 0
is the equilibrium outcome while if ￿ = L, the sharing rule ￿K = c1, ￿L = Y ￿ c1, ￿W = 0 is the
equilibrium outcome.
The subgame at t = 1 when W is enfranchised
W observes a noisy signal q. Consider, ￿rst, the situation where we require that no coalition
of classes has an incentive to reject W￿ s proposal. In this case, we claim that the best-response
o⁄er by W is ￿K = ￿L = Y ￿ c2, ￿W = 2c2 ￿ Y and moreover, no coalition of classes has an
incentive to reject W￿ s proposal. The argument proceeds as follows. Under the constraints that





with i = K;L
￿W = "L + "K
where "i, i = K;L is such that
Y ￿ c1 ￿
Y ￿ "i
2
￿ Y ￿ c2
"L + "K ￿ c0;
As c2 > Y
2 > c1 and c0 is close to 0, the above inequalities are mutually consistent. Since
Y ￿"K
2 ￿ Y ￿ c2, class K will never deviate alone. Moreover, W will never form a deviating
coalition with the elites as following any deviation W will obtain maximum c0 < ￿W. While W
9will accept to form coalition only with the weakest elite, say L; if K rejects the proposal, and grab
c0 > 0 in the bilateral post-coalition bargain against L. On the other hand W will never accept
any counter proposal of forming a coalition with K since W will get 0 in this case. Finally L will
never form a deviating coalition with K as following any deviation L will only obtain c1 ￿ Y ￿"L
2 :
In equilibrium, "i, i = K;L, will satisfy Y ￿"i
2 = Y ￿c2 or equivalently, "i = 2c2 ￿Y: Therefore, in
equilibrium, ￿K = ￿L = Y ￿ c2, ￿W = 2c2 ￿ Y .
Next, consider the situation when W￿ s is rejected with positive probability by some deviating
coalition. Note that W will never make an o⁄er that is rejected by both L and K with probability
one. Suppose that, s = K and that W "bets" on ￿ = K and makes an o⁄er that is not rejected by
K on her own. It follows that c2 is the maximum it is possible to extract from K as otherwise K
can reject W￿ s proposal and obtain Y ￿c2, by ￿ghting against the coalition W and L: Moreover, c1
is the minimum amount W will o⁄er to L as otherwise, L will have an incentive to form a deviating
coalition with K. It follows that W￿ s proposal will be ￿K = Y ￿c2, ￿L = c1 and ￿W = c2￿c1 and
moreover, with probability q no coalition of classes will reject this proposal. On the other hand,
with probability 1 ￿ q, ￿ = L. In this case, L will reject W￿ s proposal. Note that after W￿ s o⁄er
is rejected, L￿coalized with W￿ will anticipate that K will reject any o⁄er less than c2￿c0. and
therefore, propose the outcome ￿K = c2 ￿ c0, ￿L = Y ￿ c2, ￿W = c0.
Call ￿K = ￿L = Y ￿c2, ￿W = 2c2￿Y "Fair Sharing" and ￿K = Y ￿c2, ￿L = c1, ￿W = c2￿c1
"Bet on the winner". In equilibrium, W prefer fair sharing if and only if:
u(2c2 ￿ Y ) > qu(c2 ￿ c1) + (1 ￿ q)u(c0): (2)
for c1 and c2 close to 0. From Y
2 < c2 < Y it follows that u(2c2 ￿ Y ) < u(c2 ￿ c1) and W prefer














ex-ante the elites will not enfranchise W: Accordingly we state the following:
Proposition 3 There exists ￿ q < 1, such that when q > ￿ q, W is never enfranchised.
Proof. If follows directly from condition (2) with ￿ q : u(2c2 ￿Y ) = ￿ qu(c2 ￿ c1)+(1￿ ￿ q)u(c0):
The decision of enfranchising W
When W has precise information about the realization of ￿; it is not possible for elite j to
ensure against the outcome ￿ = i because W will always prefer to favor i: We will see next that
only when the information on ￿ is not perfect, the enfranchisement decision exists in equilibrium.
Now, consider the case where W has little information on ￿ and, for simplicity, assume q = 1
2, i.e.
10W is completely uniformed over ￿: Condition







ensures that fair sharing o⁄er: ￿K = ￿L = Y ￿c2, ￿W = 2c2 ￿Y will be made at the equilibrium
under full enfranchisement. As a result, ex-ante the elites K and L will always extend the franchise
if
u(Y ￿ c2) >
1
2




It is important to notice that, since
Y ￿ c1 > Y ￿ c2 > c1
and
c2 > 2c2 ￿ Y > c0;
using conditions (3) and (4), when u00(:) = 0 (with risk-neutral preferences) there will never be
enfranchisement and by continuity, if the degree of concavity of u(:) is small, again there will
be no enfranchisement. Indeed, if we consider the CRRA class of utility function, u(x) = x1￿￿
1￿￿ ,
￿ 6= 1, by computation, it is easily veri￿ed that there exists ￿ ￿, 0 < ￿ ￿ < 1, such that whenever
￿ > ￿ ￿, ￿ 6= 1, there is enfranchisement in equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes the
above discussion:
Proposition 4 When individuals are su¢ ciently risk averse K and L will always enfranchise W
4 Public goods versus transfers and enfranchisement
In this section, we study enfranchisement in a model where agents have option of invest Y in
a public good, instead of redistributing it. Moreover, we will assume that di⁄erent classes have
heterogeneous preferences over the public good location therefore, if the public good is provided,
classes either vote or bargain over its location.
4.1 Public goods bargaining and enfranchisement
We assume, for simplicity, that the entire Y must be invested in order to obtain the public good.
The location of the public good is indexed by points in R2
+ in ￿gure 1. Each individual classes
K, L and W has it maximum utility from the public good when this is located in the points




2) respectively, with ￿ l < G: Where we assumed for simplicity
11that the three classes have the same distance ￿ l among each other (i.e. the triangle (K;L;W) is
equilateral).12
If the public good is located in a point l 2 R2
+, the preferences of the three classes are described
by the utility functions
uK(G) = u(G ￿ jlj)
uL(G) = u(G ￿ jlL ￿ lj)
uW (G) = u(G ￿ jlw ￿ lj):
We assume that the production technology for the public good is such that the entire surplus
Y must be either invested in building the good or shared and consumed. Accordingly each class
propose at time 0 either a sharing rule (￿K;￿L;￿W) or the public good with location l￿: The
rest of the game is the same as before and the public good is supplied only when the proposal is
accepted at majority by the enfranchised class and the stronger elite did not object the democratic
rule. If the stronger elite objects to the location of the public good, then the public good is not
provided and the classes obtain their disagreement utility exactly like in the previous sections. It
follows that using the grab functions c(￿;￿) we can derive a grabbing function over the location
the public good, l(￿;￿), that summarize the outcomes of ex-post renegotiation, where for ￿ = i
and i 6= j
1. The grab function is symmetric in K and L i.e. l(fKg;L) = l(fLg;K) = l1 where l1 is
close to zero;
2. Without enfranchisement, l(fWg;i) = l(fWg;j) = 0 while with enfranchisement l(fWg;￿) =
l0, where l0 is small positive number arbitrarily close to zero and l0 < l1;
3. l(fj;Wg;i) = l2 >
￿ l
2
Let us de￿ne ￿ < 1




so that the good is never supplied without enfranchising W and
2c2 ￿ Y
1 ￿ ￿
< G ￿ jlLj;
12As far as W is equidistant from K and L, i.e. the triangle is isosceles, the solution will not change qualitatively.
If W is closer to one of the two elites there may be a sistematic bias of W, who will prefer the bet on winner to the
fair sharing. In this case the enfrachisement will not take place ex-ante.
12hence the non elite will always prefer the public good to the transfer.
Given these two conditions the public good is supplied in equilibrium only if the strongest
elites does not object W proposal to locate the good at distance l￿ and not prefer to grab the
surplus, i.e. G ￿ l￿ > Y ￿c2
￿ .13 From ￿gure 1 we can see that l￿ =
￿ l
2 is the point of maximum
elites￿expected utility from the public good, in order W‘s proposal not to be rejected there must








when (5) is not satis￿ed W will always propose the sharing rule ￿K = ￿L = Y ￿c2, ￿W = 2c2￿Y
to avoid the coup, and obtain 2c2 ￿ Y instead of c0: Therefore from (5) we can state
Proposition 5 If the distance between the elites is su¢ ciently large, i.e. ￿ l > 2(G ￿ Y ￿c2
￿ ) the
enfranchisement will not produce the public good supply.
Public Good Location
13We are assuming that W prefer the fair sharing rather than bet on the winner. It can be shown as before that
this is true if individuals are su¢ ciently risk averse and W‘s information on ￿ is su¢ ciently noisy.
135 A comparative analysis of Indian Democracy
In this section, we provide some descriptive and anecdotal evidence showing that our model is
able to capture the distinctive features of Indian democracy, and we compare India with other
countries, whose institutions did not achieve the same level of stability.
India is the world￿ s biggest and one of its more stable democracies. In more than 50 years
since the ￿rst election there have been 15 general elections and over 300 state contests. Both at
state level and at the centre, governments have always been elected by people with a reasonably
high level of alternance among political parties.14 It is perhaps needless to add that India enjoy
free media, freedom of assembly and association.
The decision to extend the franchise was voted unanimously by the constituent assembly,
which also declared India an Independent state. This assemnly can be considered as balanced
representation the elites (Sarkar 2001).15 In this sense, the the Democratization in India is closer
to a one shot decision than to a dynamic process.
A non redistributive democracy
The success of Indian democracy came in spite the low income, widespread poverty and il-
literacy and immense ethnic diversity. However, always consistent with our model, the Indian
democracy did very little to increase the living standard of the majority as Weiner notes:
The incorporation into the political system of backward caste elites and members of
scheduled castes has apparently done little to reduce the enormous social and economic
disparities that persist in India￿ s hierarchical and inegalitarian social order. That rise
the fundamental question: if there are now so many OBC and scheduled castes
bureaucrats and politicians, why is not re￿ ected in state policies to promote the well
being of their communities? (...) Why has the increase in political power for members
of the lower castes done so little to raise these communities? (Weiner (2001) p. 211)
Weiner￿ s observations are supported by Figure 2, depicting the index of wealth concentration
and relative poverty in India from 1946- the date of the constituent assembly, which allowed for
universal su⁄rage- to the early 1990s.16 We can observe that income inequality and relative poverty
14Although the congress has traditionally been the dominating force, in 1977 it is thrown out. In 1980 it is voted
back, in 1989 Indians opted again for a change and in 1991 the congress goes to power again.
15The constituent body were elected through indirect elections, chosen by provincial legislatures that had been
elected in early 1946, by a pool of 10 percent of the entire population.
16Gini index and last income quintile: Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset. GDP per capita growth:
Penn Table.
14hardly present any downward tend, in spite of often positive growth rates.17 No redistribution
clearly took place: the Gini Index of wealth concentration, changed from 35 in 1951 to 32 in 1991;
18 altogether, the funds allocated for the three main antipoverty programs constituted only the
4% of the total allocation in the plan where this project took place.19
Furthermore, in ￿gure 2 we can observe very little evidence of education provision; there is
very low level of education characterizing the Indian population in 1960, 11 years after the ￿rst
election, and only a marginal decrease until 1990. The share of individuals above 25 years that
completed the ￿rst level passed from 6.3% in 1960 to only 8.5% in 1990, while the ones without
any schooling changed from 75% in 1960 to 60% in the 1990.20 Moreover there is a widespread
consensus that level of health care is persistently neglegetd in many part of India. Always in this
respect, Sen (1995) notes:
If we were to look back at what has happened in India in the ￿rst four decades
of planned development, two general failures appear particularly glaring. First, in
contrast with what was promised by the political leadership which took India to in-
dependence, very little has been achieved in "the ending of poverty and ignorance
and disease and inequality of opportunity" the "tasks ahead" that Jawaharlal Nehru
identi￿ed in his famous speech on the eve of independence, on August 14th 1947. Four
decades of allegedly "interventionist" planning did little to make the country literate,
provide a wide-based health service, achieve comprehensive land reforms, or end the
rampant social inequalities that blight the material prospects of the underprivileged.
We can therefore argue that there is little evidence of public good supply after the enfran-
chisement.
Distribution of power between the elites
At the onset of the constituent assembly the stronger dominant classes were constituted by
large landowners and the industrial urban class often in con￿ ict within each other. The uncertainty
on their respective e⁄ective power is ampli￿ed by social, religious and as well as regional divisions.
The caste system was an institutional way to organize this fragmentation, but at the same time,
17Recently, in the early 2000s, we started to observe a decline in the poverty rate, but this is due to ￿trickle
down￿growth, rather than to wealth redistribution.
18Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset.
19Brass 1990.
20Barro and Lee Dataset.
1516it perpetrated these divisions. These divisions were already present in the Mogul￿ s era but they
were exacerbated by the English rulers, that thoroughly implemented the divide and rule, trying
to prevent the formation of any coalition that could represent a threat (Moore 1966).
In this respect India deeply di⁄er from in the Imperial China and tzarist Russia, both char-
acterized by a strong central power. Even more remarkable is the comparison between India
with Pakistan, either for their geographic proximity and for the common past as English colonies.
In contrast with India, Pakistan is characterized by an overwhelming Sunny Muslim majority,
which favorised the formation of a strong and uni￿ed elite. 21 Although the creation of Pakistani
democracy was conteporaneus to the indian democracy, until now it has been destabilized by four
major military coups (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999).
Composition of the non elites
The fragmentation of low classes in India mirrors the ones of the elites, and also in this
respect Indian society is di⁄erent from China and Russia, where the lower classes had less marked
divisions, and for this reason resulted stronger in their revolutionary power. A proof of this
political weakness is represented by the general weakness of the communist parties in India. They
have never been strong at a central level, and, when they gained some representativity at local
level, like in the West Bengal, they have always supported moderate policies of redistribution
rather than dramatic change in the economic system (Moore 1966). Therefore, we can argue
that Indian lower classes would never be able to have an high level of bargaining power (i:e:c0
su¢ ciently small).
In spite of their sociopolitical di⁄erences the degree of ethnic con￿ ict in India has always been
less serious than in African countries, and it is conceivable that the non elites can potentially ally
together against the elites, irrespectively of their ethnic origin. The fact that the Congress party
and the coalition of parties in power at the central government during the di⁄erent legislatures
are not organized on an ethnic basis (Horowitz 1985) supports this claim. This is a fundamental
precondition for our model, where we assumed that the non elites W acts together. If part of W
belong to the same groups that the stronger elite, say i; it may have an incentive to ally with i
because of the ethnic identity, rather than oppose it and allying with the rest of W.22
The lower level of inter-ethnic con￿ ict in Indian society is perhaps due to the geographic
21Until 1961, the presence of a bengali-muslim population in Pakistan generated a con￿ ict with the west Pakistani
majority, but their political power has always been small (Rashiduzzaman 1982). In 1961, the Bengali minority,
with the help of India, obtained their independence with the formation of Bangladesh.
22Or, more materialistically, the power of commitment represented by the social linkages allows the stronger elite
to credibly promise some surplus to every member of their same ethnic group, dividing in that way W:
17dispersion of Indian ethnic groups. On the contrary, when di⁄erent ethnic groups are concentrated
in the di⁄erent region of the country, it is much more likely that the non elites will not ally
horizontally within each other, but prefer to ally vertically with the elites of the same group. The
ethnical characterization of the Southern African parties provides a support to this argument.
In Nigeria, for example, after independence three essentially ethnic parties had emerged: the
Northern People￿ s Congress (NPC) drawing its support from the Hausa and Fulani tribes of the
North, the Action Group (AG), drawing its support from the Yoruba tribes of Western Nigeria,
and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) relying on the support of the
Ibo of Eastern Nigeria. In this political panorama it is hard to imagine a uni￿ed non elites that,
￿rst, does not bet on the winner after the enfranchisement and, second, turns compact against
the prevailing elites if this mounts a coup.
In this respect, the two following episodes describing an attempt of coup in India and a
successful coup in Nigeria seems to support our results. In India, Indira Gandhi used the promise
of alleviating poverty to burst her popularity and concentrate the power in her person. This
culminated when Indira Gandhi had the then president Faqr ud dub Ali Ahmed, declare a national
emergency, which was clearly unconstitutional since this proclamation was not discussed by council
ministers (Rudolph and Rudolph (2001)). After this act Gandhi lost her enormous popular
support and in the need of con￿rm her legitimacy she called and lost elections in 1977.23 In
terms of our model Indira Gandhi sought the alliance of the non elites to disenfranchise the other
parties by promising more distribution, but this commitment was not credible and the non elites
preferred the alliances with the other party. As already Kohli (2001) notes: "The fact that she
was voted out of power following the emergency only con￿rm the e¢ cacy of indian democracy"
The ￿rst elections held in Nigeria in 1959 saw the victory of the NPC which after one year
declared the state of emergency in the western region whose local government, leaded by the AG,
was proscribed and its leader arrested. Far from rejecting this outcome and turning compact
against the NPC, the lower classes split along the ethnic and geographic lines, which lead the
country to a long civil war that lasted until 1970 (Ake 1985).
23The Janata party won the elections.
186 Appendix
We prove lemma 1. The proof proceeds as follows. We begin by establishing some properties
of the Nash bargaining solution. For any two classes, i;j bargaining over a surplus of size m,
with disagreement points di;j, dj;i (for simplicity we henceforth omit the second subscript) with
di +dj < m, the Nash bargaining outcome is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
ci;cj
(u(ci) ￿ di)(u(cj) ￿ dj)
ci + cj ￿ m;ci ￿ 0;cj ￿ 0:
Notice that at any optimum ci + cj = m. As long as limc!0 u0(c) = 1, any solution to the







As u0(:) > 0;u00(:) < 0, it follows that if di > dj, ci > cj and therefore, as ci + cj = m,
ci > m
2 > cj. Let ci (di;dj;m);cj (di;dj;m) denote the solutions to the Nash bargaining problem.
Then, again using the FOC, as di ! m and dj ! 0, it follows that limdj!0 ci (di;dj;m) = m
and limdj!0 cj (di;dj;m) = 0. Further, by substituting the solutions of the Nash bargaining
solution in (u(ci) ￿ di)(u(cj) ￿ dj) we can also write down the value function of the coalition
fi;jg as a function of m, Vfi;jg (m). Note that by standard results in duality, Vfi;jg (m) is an
increasing, concave function of m and as limc!0 u0(c) = 1, limm!0 V 0
fi;jg (m) = 1. Suppose now
the coalition fi;jg is bargaining with a class k over a surplus of size Y , with disagreement points












ck + cfi;jg ￿ Y;ck ￿ 0;cfi;jg ￿ 0:
But, then, as before,if dk < dfi;jg, ck < cfi;jg and cfi;jg > Y
2 > ck. Using,these results
and the assumptions made on the disagreement functions d￿;￿0(￿), it immediately follows that
c(fKg;L) = c(fLg;K) = c1, (or equivalently, c(fKg;K) = c(fLg;L) = Y ￿c1) where c1 is close to
zero and Y ￿c1 > c1 and for ￿ = i and i 6= j;without enfranchisement, c(fWg;i) = c(fWg;j) = 0
while c(fW;jg;i) = c2 > Y
2 . Moreover with enfranchisement, for ￿ = i when W bargains with
j 6= i, W obtains a share of the surplus c0 > 0 while if W bargains with i, W0s share of the surplus
is 0 and therefore, conditional on ￿ = i, if i objects to the winning proposal from the voting
round, W will form a coalition with j 6= i and bargain with i. Therefore, with enfranchisement,
c(fWg;￿) = c0.
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